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The State Lottery Tax: An Equity Analysis
Ben Smith
ABSTRACT: This paper finds the state lottery tax to be vertically inequitable. The tax is
inherently regressive, meaning poorer income classes spend a larger share of their income
on lottery products than higher income classes. The paper also finds the lottery tax to be
horizontally inequitable. Older people, males, less educated individuals, and minorities
(except Asians) all tend to spend more on lottery products than their respective
counterparts. Policy makers should lower the implicit tax rate from its current level of
44% to 19%. A decrease in the tax rate will increase state revenue, increase consumer
surplus, possibly stimulate the economy, and decrease the inequities outlined above.

I. Introduction
Not only did I work two jobs, my wife wasn’t well and she had
to work. I’d stop at a gas station where they sold lottery tickets.
The guy’d stay open for me until I got there. I’d buy $20 worth
of lottery tickets and he’d put it on my credit card as a gas
purchase or car repair. You couldn’t put lottery ticket purchases
on a credit card. I would get my bill each month and pay $200 or
so, and the total bill would stay the same or rise some each
month. [Clotfelter and Cook, 1989, 123].
I have been married to “Jim” for 28 years. We have four grown
kids and I have always worked to help out with the bills. I’ve
earned a rest and I would love to stay home but I can’t. Why?
Because my husband spends half of his paycheck every week on
lottery tickets…If it weren’t for the lottery I would have decent
furniture, carpets and draperies. He tells me I am lucky he
doesn’t drink or smoke or chase women. Maybe so, but I feel
cheated. [Clotfelter and Cook, 1989, 123].
The lottery can be quite invasive in some people’s lives. In an age of
fancy automobiles, yachts, and 25,000 square foot mansions, people will
do anything to strike it rich. “If you don’t play, you can’t win” is a
common phrase heard from avid lottery players. Just who is the typical
lottery player? Does lottery play vary across income and social classes?
If so, does it adversely affect some of these classes more than others and
1
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can anything be done about it?
As it turns out, it isn’t possible to predict exactly who will play the
lottery. What appears to be true, however, is that the poorest income
classes spend the greatest proportion of their personal income on the
lottery. This is an issue that demands attention since the state lottery is
a form of taxation. A large portion of each dollar spent on the lottery
accrues directly to the state as revenue. The fact that poorer citizens
spend a higher share of their income on the lottery violates the traditional
American pattern of personal taxation which holds that as income
increases, the proportion of income paid in taxes should increase.
Older people, men, the undereducated, and minorities all spend more
on lottery tickets than their respective counterparts. This also violates the
traditional American taxation ideal which holds that people with equal
income levels should pay equal amounts in taxes. Therefore, shouldn’t
we as a society ban the state lotteries for good since they are causing
financial distress and affect some more than others? Not necessarily.
State lotteries provide more to the consumer than just an avenue to
overfill the state governments’ pockets—they provide excitement and
entertainment.
As will be shown, reducing the implicit lottery tax rate from its
current level of 44% to an optimal level of 19% would accomplish four
things: one, it would increase state revenue; two, it would increase
consumer surplus; three, it might stimulate the private sector of the
economy; and four, it would reduce the inequities of the lottery tax.

II. Lottery History and Terminology
State-run lotteries in the United States began in 1789, just after the
Constitution was signed. Since no reliable forms of collecting local taxes
existed, lotteries were used to fund expenditures including those for
prisons, courthouses, and orphanages. Prior to the Civil War, threehundred schools, two-hundred churches, and fifty colleges—including
Yale, Princeton, and Harvard—were erected with lottery proceeds. By
1905, however, Congress banned the last of the state lotteries in
Louisiana because privately-operated lotteries were corrupt due to lower
than advertised payouts or no payout at all. [North American Association
of State and Provincial Lotteries, 2001a] The corruption in the private
sector had given a bad name to lotteries in general. Therefore, lotteries
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had lost their effectiveness as revenue raising tools for both the private
and public sectors.
As hikes in income or property taxes became increasingly unpopular
in the eyes of citizens, some states were forced to find alternatives to
traditional forms of taxation. In 1964, New Hampshire became the first
to revive the lottery as a source of state revenue. In order to avoid the
seventy-year-old federal anti-lottery statutes, New Hampshire tied the
“Sweepstakes” to horse races. As one might have predicted, the
unpopularity of these lotteries with state government officials across the
country soon gave way to their powerful revenue raising ability. By
1973, total lottery sales for the United States surpassed five-hundred
million dollars; only three years later total sales had more than doubled,
surpassing one billion dollars. [North American Association of State and
Provincial Lotteries, 2001a]
Today, thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia operate
lotteries to generate revenue. Total revenue for the United States in fiscal
year 2000 amounted to nearly $38 billion [North American Association
of State and Provincial Lotteries, 2001b]. In 1999, lottery revenues in
Iowa were $45.83 million and total tax revenue in Iowa was $11.63
billion [North American Association of State and Provincial Lotteries,
2001b; U.S. Census Bureau, 2001]. Therefore, lottery revenues
accounted for .39% of the 1999 Iowa budget.
State lottery systems typically sell three games:
1. Instant. Tickets contain a section with an opaque coating that when
scratched off by the player reveals what prize, if any, has been won.
2. Numbers. This game involves selection of a three or four-digit
number in a frequent, usually daily, drawing. Prizes are usually fixed
amounts.
3. Lotto. The player selects numbers from a defined range, say six from
1 to 44 (a 6/44 game). A drawing, usually weekly, awards a prize
determined by the amount bet on that game that is divided among
those picking the correct numbers. Monies not won roll into the next
prize pool. Because there are many possible number combinations
(7,059,052 in a 6/44 game, for instance), the prizes often roll over and
the pool can become enormous. Source: [Mikesell, 1989, 514].
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Equity Analysis

When examining the properties of taxation, two important principles
surface: vertical and horizontal equity. Vertical equity is the notion that
people with less ability to pay (i.e. lower income) should bear less of the
tax burden, and people with higher ability to pay (i.e. higher income)
should bear more of the tax burden [Bruce, 2001, 374]. Thus, if a tax is
vertically equitable, it is ordinarily progressive. A tax is progressive if,
as income increases, the proportion of one’s income paid in taxes also
increases. Alternatively, a tax is regressive if, as income decreases, the
proportion of one’s income paid in taxes increases. Property and income
taxes, for example, adhere to the principle of vertical equity. Horizontal
equity demands that if people have equal ability to pay, they should pay
equal amounts in taxes [Bruce, 2001, 374]. So regardless of race, sex,
age, or other factors, persons with equal levels of income should pay
equal amounts in taxes. The question arises, then, if state-run lotteries
sustain these equity principles. As it turns out, the vast majority of the
evidence shows that the lottery tax fails to meet either equity principle.
A. VERTICAL EQUITY
As one’s personal income increases, it is likely that one’s
discretionary income will increase as well. Discretionary income is the
remainder of one’s personal income after all taxes, mortgage payments,
groceries, transportation expenses, and other mandatory payments have
been made. Purchasing a lottery ticket is not mandatory, so it is a
discretionary purchase. One might therefore deduce that as income
decreases, the likelihood that an individual will purchase a lottery ticket
will likewise decrease. Unfortunately, this does not appear to be the case
at all.
A March 1986 Los Angeles Times survey on weekly expenditures on
instant games tickets in California found that household lottery
expenditures as a percentage of household income monotonically
decreased as income increased: 2.1% of income was spent on lottery
tickets by people with income below $10,000 and only .3% of income
was spent on lottery tickets by consumers with income above $60,000
[Clotfelter and Cook, 1987, 537]. This clearly implies that the lottery tax
is regressive and violates the principle of vertical equity. In the fall of
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1991, survey results from all lottery games in the states of Florida,
Virginia, and Colorado showed the same pattern of regressivity. For a
household with an annual income of less than $20,000, the annual excise
tax as a percentage of income was .4001%, while for incomes above
$80,000 it was only .110% [Borg and Stranahan, 1998].
Using a measure called the Suits Index, which ranges from -1 (one
person with zero income purchases all the tickets—complete regressivity)
to 1 (one person with all income purchases all the tickets—complete
progressivity), a study based on data from 195 Texas counties also found
the implicit lottery tax to be regressive for all games. The Suits Index
was -.058 for lotto, -.129 for instant, and -.099 for all lottery games
[Novak and Price, 2000, 87]. The table below lists Suits Indices from
various other studies conducted on lottery taxation. Notice that in all
cases the lottery tax is regressive, while other forms of taxation (income,
property) have a positive Suits coefficient indicating that the tax is
progressive.
This is just a sample of many studies conducted—in general, the
instant game has been found to be the most regressive, the numbers game
is less regressive, and the lotto game is the least regressive. It has been
argued that one of the main causes of poverty is the habit of seeking
instant gratification. Thus, the finding that the instant games are more
regressive than lotto tickets confirms the theory that poor people are more
present value oriented.
The preponderance of evidence available suggests that the lottery tax
is highly regressive, with one notable exception. In an analysis of Illinois
county lottery sales from 1985-1987, Mikesell found “scant evidence of
regressivity” [1989, 519]. Even though Mikesell found income
elasticities to be less than one for instant games (an elasticity equal to one
implies a proportional tax), they were not statistically significant [1989,
519]. Despite this one study, the evidence is nearly conclusive. I feel it
is safe to conclude that the excise tax on all lottery products is extremely
regressive. Therefore, the principle of vertical equity is grossly violated.
Suits Index Estimates for Various Taxes
Type of Tax
Individual Income Tax (1989)
Individual Income Tax (1988)

Suits Index
0.06
0.28
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Real Property Tax (1970)
Maryland Lotto Game
Pennsylvania Lotto Game
Maryland four-digit numbers
Maryland three-digit numbers
Maryland Instant Game
Colorado Instant Game
Michigan Instant Game
California Instant Game

0.18
-0.36
-0.2
-0.42
-0.48
-0.41
-0.1
-0.37
-0.32

Source: [Novak and Price, 1999, 751]

B. HORIZONTAL EQUITY
Horizontal equity can be violated on the basis of numerous
sociodemographic characteristics: age, gender, education, race, and
personal preferences. Theoretically, taxes should penalize all citizens
equally regardless of any of these characteristics. Unfortunately, the state
lotteries don’t appear to follow this desirable pattern.
1. Generational Equity
Some studies indicate that the pattern of lottery play by age follows
an inverted U pattern. For example, a Los Angeles Times poll
conducted in 1986 found the highest participation rates were for the
age group of 45-65, with lower participation rates in both older and
younger age groups (see graph below). Likewise, Hansen found an
inverted U pattern for age in the Colorado Instant Game from 19891990 [1995, 394].
Other studies have found different results. Borg and Stranahan
found that age does not affect the decision to play and older players
spend more on lottery tickets [1998b, 76]. Translated into layman’s
terms, age does not affect the decision to play, but if a person does
play, older people will spend more. In fact, Borg and Mason reported
a 65 year old citizen spends $4.40 more per week than a 25 year old
citizen [1988, 77].

Smith: The State Lottery Tax

7

Sourc
e: derived from Clotfelter and Cook, 1989, 96

Additionally, a 1994 study found that in 1983, as the percentage
of the population over age 65 increased, per capita lottery sales
decreased; in 1990, the data showed that as the percentage of the
population over 65 increased, so did per capita lottery sales [Jackson,
1994, 322]. These results indicate that older citizens are playing
more as the lottery matures. Finally, a study of 1994 Texas lottery
sales found a negative relationship between age and the Lotto game
and age and the Pick 3 game; alternatively, it found a positive
relationship between age and the Instant game [Novak and Price,
1999, 746]. The most apparent implication is that older players spend
more on the more regressive games.
Although no definite pattern surfaces regarding age and lottery
play, most of the results reveal that lottery play is not equal across all
age groups. It appears, however, that the participation rate of older
citizens is increasing as indicated in the more recent studies.
2. Gender Equity
The graph below shows that the participation rate in California is
40% for men and 36% for women. This shows that the participation
rates for men and women are very similar, but the more noticeable
difference in play is found in the amount wagered. Men tend to
purchase more tickets than the women who participate [Clotfelter and
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Cook, 1989, 97]. In fact, white males spend one dollar more per
week than white females, and black males spend four dollars more
per week than black females [Clotfelter and Cook, 1987, 541]. Price
and Novak found that males are more likely to play the lotto and are
less likely to play the numbers game than are females [Novak and
Price, 1999, 749]. Contrary to most findings in the literature,
however, Borg and Stranahan found no significant gender
relationship for either the participation rate or the amount wagered
[1998, 76].

Source: derived from Clotfelter and Cook, 1989, 96

3. Educational Equity
While a little research has been done concerning the impact of age
and gender on lottery play, a multitude of studies have investigated
the effect of education and race. Not surprisingly, these variables
seem to have an even more pronounced effect on lottery play.
As revealed in the graph below, there is a systematic decline in
lottery participation rates as the level of education increases. For
example, respondents who did not graduate high school had a
participation rate of 49%, while only 30% of respondents with a
college degree played. Mikesell confirmed this result when he
documented that Illinois counties with more residents with greater
than 16 years of education have lower per capita lottery sales [1989,
518]. While Borg and Stranahan did not find that educational
attainment affected the participation rate, their findings clearly
showed that those players with the least education spent the most on
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tickets [1998a, 78]. More specifically, Borg and Stranahan found that
households with heads who did not graduate from high school spend
$6.87 more per month than identical households with heads who had
gone to college [Borg and Stranahan, 1998b, 109]. This is
disconcerting since in 1998 high school dropouts earned only
$15,959, high school graduates earned an average of $24,110,
bachelor’s degree recipients earned $44,740, and advanced degree
recipients earned $62,935 [American Council on Education, 2000,
para. 3 and 5]. A parallel analysis of 1983 and 1990 data from
Massachusetts found that as the level of education increases, per
capita sales in a community declines [Jackson, 1994, 318].

Source: derived from Clotfelter and Cook, 1989, 96

A more detailed study using 1994 data from Texas examined the
relationship between education level and each of the three Texas
State Lottery games: Lotto, Pick 3, and Instant games. Novak and
Price found that education level and the purchase of instant games
were negatively correlated, education and Pick 3 had no correlation,
and education and the Lotto had a positive correlation. Novak and
Price noted that the Instant games were the most regressive and the
Lotto was the least regressive. They concluded that as education
level increases, the likelihood of playing the most regressive games
declines [Novak and Price, 2000, 90]. Novak and Price found similar
results in their 1999 analysis of the Texas State Lottery [748].
Additionally, Borg and Stranahan pointed out that most of the $6.87
referred to in the preceding paragraph was spent on the most
regressive game, the Instant game [1998b, 109]. Given that less
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educated individuals are more likely to have lower income levels, this
evidence confirms the regressivity of the lottery tax.
It is important to mention that the evidence on the relationship
between educational attainment and lottery play is not conclusive.
The 1989-1990 data from the Colorado lottery suggests that both the
less than college and college completion variables had positive
impacts on lottery sales. Thus, Hansen concluded that educational
attainment had no discernable impact on lottery sales [1995, 395]. In
spite of this piece of controversial evidence, Mikesell notes that the
negative relationship between educational attainment and per capita
lottery sales is “consistently the strongest found, possibly indicating
an element of horizontal inequity in lottery finance,” [1989, 518].

4. Racial Equity
The graph below illustrates the disparate participation rates among
the races. On the upper end, Hispanics had a participation rate of
55%; on the lower end, Asians only had a 32% participation rate.
The data also reveals a noteworthy comparison: whites had a one
percentage point higher participation rate than blacks.

Source: derived from Clotfelter and Cook, 1989, 96

Novak and Price concluded that the minority population (Blacks and
Hispanics) were more likely to purchase the most regressive products
(instant game) and less likely to purchase the least regressive
products (lotto) in their analysis of the 1994 Texas Lottery [2000,
90]. Mikesell uncovered similar evidence in that the percentage of
the population that was Black and per-capita sales were positively
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related for instant game sales in Illinois counties [1989, 519]. In
addition to the apparent horizontal inequity, this implies that
minorities are paying a vertically inequitable portion of the state
lottery tax since Hispanics only earn 67.6% and Blacks only 79.6%
of the weekly wages of Whites as of 2001 [Bureau of Labor
Statistics, 2001]. In another analysis of the 1994 Texas State Lottery,
Novak and Price found both Blacks and Hispanics spend greater
amounts on the more regressive games than the non-minority
population [1999, 747].
1991 data from Colorado, Florida, and Virginia showed that
while race does not affect participation rates, minorities spend
significantly more on lottery games than Caucasians [Borg and
Stranahan, 1998b, 76]. Interestingly, Borg and Stranahan also found
the average Caucasian pays $47.12 in lottery taxes per year, while the
average Black pays $96.10 per year. Hispanics were also found to
pay disproportionate amounts of lottery taxes, but the amounts were
not significantly different from that of Whites [1998b, 79]. The two
economists also concluded that lottery advertising more significantly
affects the amount paid in tax per year for Blacks than for Whites.
When advertising interactions were included in their model, Borg and
Stranahan found the average Caucasian’s annual tax was virtually
unchanged at $46.41, while the average Black’s increased to an
astounding $124.40 [1998b, 81]. Thus, Borg and Stranahan
concluded that lottery advertising exacerbates the horizontal inequity
of the lottery tax for Blacks.
Analysis of a two-month period of the 1986 California state
lottery found Blacks spent an average of $4.50 more than Whites
[Clotfelter and Cook, 1987, 541]. Likewise, data analysis from 518
Illinois State Lottery winners from 1984-1986 revealed nonwhites
spend over $6.00 more per week more than Whites [Borg and Mason,
1988, 77].
The literature concerning the horizontal equity of the lottery tax
pertaining to race is not in universal agreement. None of the
evidence, however, suggests that the lottery tax is in any way
horizontally equitable. Even if the participation rates are roughly the
same across the races, it is apparent that minorities tend to spend
more on lotteries than do whites. According to Borg and Mason,
“Given that minorities make up a disproportionately large percentage
of the poor, this finding foreshadows the likely regressivity of the tax
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contained in the lottery,” [1988, 77].

5. Preferential Equity
Another violation of horizontal equity becomes apparent when
examining data from the March 1986 California lottery. If the state
lotteries were preferentially equitable, then all adults over the age of
21 with equal ability to pay would pay equal amounts in the lottery
tax regardless of their preference to play the lottery. This would
imply that all adults should play the lottery for it to be preferentially
and in turn horizontally equitable. Clotfelter and Cook found that
52% of the adult population accounted for all lottery purchases [1989,
93]. Given that the unemployment rate in California in March of
1986 was 6.9%, the participation rate should have been closer to
93.1% to be horizontally equitable [Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2002].
More interestingly, roughly 20% of those who did play accounted for
an astounding 65% of all purchases [Clotfelter and Cook, 1989, 93].
Although not of the same magnitude as the common “80/20” rule
(which holds that 80% of purchases come from 20% of the
customers), this result still violates horizontal equity. In May 1986,
Clotfelter and Cook found similar results in California where only
23% of the players purchased nearly 69% of the tickets [1987, 540].
C. OBSERVATIONS
The empirical evidence supports the theory that state run lotteries as we
know them today violate horizontal and vertical equity on many levels.
Not only are lotteries inherently regressive, instant games are the most
regressive.
This inherent regressivity violates vertical equity.
Unfortunately, citizens who are older, minorities (except Asians), and less
educated tend to purchase the most regressive games. As noted earlier,
income is negatively correlated with age, minorities make up a
disproportionately large percentage of the poor, and less educated people
make less income. So one can conclude with a high degree of confidence
that the most regressive games are supported disproportionately by those
in society who have the least ability to pay. In addition, not all citizens
who have the ability to pay are paying their equitable portion of the
lottery tax, and a small percentage of those that do pay account for a
majority of purchases.
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IV. Policy Implications
Now that it has been established that state lotteries are neither
horizontally or vertically equitable, it is important to examine methods of
reducing this inequity. Although the state lotteries are a form of taxation,
the fact remains that they also have characteristics of consumption. If all
humans are completely rational and all information is known, not a single
ticket would ever be sold as an investment because people would want to
avoid paying any more taxes than required. Yet sales have grown by over
16% (compounded annually) per year since 1976, so this is obviously not
the case.1 One might conclude that humans are not rational, especially
since the less educated spend more on lotteries. However, the lottery
offers more to citizens than just a way to pay more of their hard earned
dollars to the government—it is a form of entertainment. The lottery
offers the excitement of striking it rich like few other forms of gambling
can. So even though the expected value of a lottery ticket is less than its
price, net consumer utility is positive. Therefore, it is not in the best
interests of consumers, as measured by utility, to recommend that the
lottery should be removed from the growing list of ways to raise tax
revenues; rather, policymakers should explore ways of increasing
consumer utility. One such method would be to decrease the take-out
rate.
According to 1987 data collected on all state lotteries in the United
States, the average break-down of each dollar spent is as follows: $0.50
is paid out in the form of prizes, $0.12 is allocated to operating expenses,
and the remaining $0.38 accrues to the state as profit [Clotfelter and
Cook, 1989, 26-27]. Of the $.012 allocated to operating expenses,
roughly $0.06 is paid to retailers in the form of commissions [DeBoer,
1985, 479]. Therefore, the average takeout rate is essentially 44% (1.56). In comparison, the average takeout rate in 2000 on the “Las Vegas
Strip” was 6.02% [Nevada Gaming Control Board, 4]. If casino gambling
is well known as a “social evil” amongst many politicians, it seems odd
that consumers get an even greater negative return on their investment
playing the lottery than they would gambling in Las Vegas. And since
advertising portrays the lottery as a way to get to the greener grass on the
other side of the fence, policymakers should decrease the takeout to a
level comparable to slot machines. The individual demand curve below
illustrates how decreasing the takeout rate will increase consumer surplus.
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If the takeout rate is set at level E, consumer surplus is area ABE. If the
takeout is lowered to level D consumer surplus increases to area ACD for
a net gain to consumers of area EBCD.

Takeout
Rate
(T=1-E[V])

E
C

Source: derived from Clotfelter and Cook, 1987, 535

The preceding argument sounds good, but state lotteries are in business
to increase the revenue of the state—not consumer utility. However, a
happy medium between a takeout rate of 44% and that of 6% might be the
best solution for increasing both consumer utility and state revenue. In
1979, Suits found the price elasticity of demand for pari-mutuel betting
to be in the range of -1.6 to -2.7 [DeBoer, 1985, 484]. DeBoer
hypothesized that if the price elasticity of demand for lottery tickets was
similar to that of pari-mutuel betting, the low marginal cost of lottery
production implies a profit-maximizing takeout rate much lower than
those currently in use [1985, 484-485]. One year later, DeBoer found the
price elasticity of demand for the lottery to be -1.19 and the marginal cost
of lottery operation to be less than 3 cents for each additional sales dollar
[1986, 595]. DeBoer could now calculate the tax rate which would
maximize net lottery revenue using the formula from the monopoly
pricing model (e x MC)/(1 + e), where e is the elasticity and MC is the
marginal cost of operation. Since e equals -1.19 and MC equals 3 cents,
DeBoer found the optimal tax rate (takeout rate) to be 19%, which is
much lower than those currently in use [1986, 595].
Assuming that DeBoer’s calculation is correct, his finding that the
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revenue maximizing takeout rate is 19% is very significant. It has already
been illustrated how lowering the takeout rate will increase consumer
utility. DeBoer’s finding shows that not only consumer utility but also
state lottery revenue will increase if the takeout rate is lowered. And
even if DeBoer’s findings aren’t completely accurate, a takeout rate of
19% is substantially lower than the current rate of 44%. Thus, there is
plenty of room for error.
Gulley and Scott also calculated the revenue maximizing price
elasticity of demand to be -1.19; in comparison, the estimated elasticity
for the Massachusetts Mass Millions game was -1.92 [1993, 20]. With
this information, the economists concluded that the Mass Millions
revenue was not maximized and the takeout rate should be lowered.
Interestingly, Gulley and Scott also found that the Megabucks lotto
revenue was not maximized, but that the Kentucky and Ohio lotteries’
revenues were maximized [1993, 21].
Even more evidence in the literature suggests that decreasing the
takeout rate might increase state revenue. Efficiency can be defined as
achieving the highest level of utility from the available resources.
Rodgers and Stuart determined that since lottery taxes are less efficient
than labor income taxes for raising marginal public revenue, the takeout
rate on lotteries should be reduced and labor income taxes should be
increased to raise efficiency levels [1995, 243]. In a multi-state analysis
of lotteries in 1987, Borg, Mason, and Shapiro found that for every dollar
in revenue accumulated through the lottery, as much as 23 cents in
revenue from other state sources is forfeited in states without income
taxes but high sales and excise taxes [1993, 139]. One can infer that
ceteris paribus, government officials can expect that future lottery growth
will lead to a decline in other revenue sources.
Although the evidence does not suggest that all state lotteries would
increase tax revenue by decreasing the takeout rate, it is clear that
policymakers should consider it as a way to increase revenue and benefit
the consumer. It has been shown that individual lottery winners from
Massachusetts in the 1980’s saved an average of 16% of winnings and
that the savings rate increased as the proportion of the prize increased
[Imbens and Rubin and Sacerdote, 2001, 793]. Therefore, by decreasing
the takeout rate, the number of winners and/or the magnitude of the
jackpots would increase, thereby stimulating the economy through an
increase in savings. In turn, the economic growth would lead to an
increase in tax revenues from other sources.
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Some evidence exists to suggest that reducing the takeout rate might
help correct the horizontal and/or vertical equity issues with the state
lottery. In 1945 and 1975 national surveys on gambling participation was
shown to increase with formal education [Clotfelter and Cook, 1989, 97].
Consider that the takeout rates in Nevada were 5.23% for slot machines
and 14.41% for table games in 2000 [Nevada Gaming Control Board, 4].
Additionally consider that the average takeout rate in state lottery games
is 44%. If the takeout rate for state lotteries decreased to levels much
closer to those of other forms of gambling, then participation among more
educated individuals would likely increase. Because income increases
with formal education, the regressivity of the lottery tax might very well
decrease and ease the inherent vertical inequity. Additionally, horizontal
inequity would decrease, at least on the educational level, since more
educated persons would be drawn to participate and/or bet more.
In recent years, however, casinos, dog tracks, and horseracing have
become more prevalent in states other than Nevada. The repercussion of
this is that the poorer, uneducated people have gained access to gambling
that they otherwise couldn’t have because the transportation costs to Las
Vegas were too high. In a 1995 study of Mississippi gambling, Rivenbark
found the casino tax to be regressive for both casino-counties and noncasino counties, with casino-counties displaying the highest regressivity
[1998, 586]. Rivenbark also found that as education levels increased, the
amount spent on casino gambling decreased, ceteris paribus [1998, 586].
Even though this evidence contradicts the previous analysis, assume
that more educated consumers are more informed and more rational. Also
assume that the consumer has a choice of playing the lottery or a slot
machine as a form of weekend entertainment. The consumer will choose
to play the game that has the highest expected value. Given that the
expected value of a lottery ticket or a slot machine pull is equal to (1takeout rate), the consumer will choose to play the slot machine.
Theoretically, then, reducing the takeout rate will lead to an increase in
the participation of more educated consumers, thereby decreasing the
educational inequity of the lottery. Additionally, since it has been
established that more educated individuals earn a higher average income,
the regressivity of the lottery tax might also decrease.
Additional evidence exists that the lottery tax is too high. Consider
the excise tax rates in 1985 on the consumer products listed below. It has
been established that the poor spend a disproportionately large amount of
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their personal income on lottery tickets. Therefore, a lottery ticket can be
considered an inferior good (an increase in income will cause a leftward
shift in demand). In contrast, consumer expenditure surveys reveal that
liquor is normal throughout the income distribution and that the other
commodities are normal overall [Clotfelter and Cook, 1987, 543]. Unless
lotteries exhibit more substantial negative externalities than the other
products, the lottery excise tax is too high relative to other excise taxes.
Clotfelter and Cook point out that given the regressivity of the implicit
lottery tax, any reduction in lottery tax rates would have distributional
effects favoring those groups that play the most [1987, 544]. Therefore,
decreasing the lottery tax would ease the vertical inequity of state
lotteries. In addition, because a consumer’s preference to play the lottery
is taxed at a drastically higher rate than another consumer’s preference to
consume alcohol and tobacco products, the preferential inequity of the
state lottery tax would decrease to a level more in line with other products
which exhibit negative externalities.
Product

Tax Rate

Lotteries

46%

Liquor

30%

Wine

13%

Beer

12%

Tobacco

33%

Source: derived from Clotfelter and Cook, 1987, 544

V. Conclusion
To the untrained eye or the untuned ear, state lotteries as we know them
today may appear to be a vehicle by which a tax-paying citizen can beat
the odds and strike it rich. However, it has been shown that state lotteries
possess other undesirable characteristics as well. The state lotteries
violate vertical equity through their inherent regressivity. The poorest
income classes pay a disproportionately large amount of their personal
income as a lottery tax compared to higher income classes.
The state lottery tax violates horizontal equity on the basis of age,
sex, education, race, and personal preferences. No conclusive evidence
exists on the participation rates across the age groups, but it appears older
players spend more on the lottery and play the most regressive games.
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This is doubly unfortunate because of the negative correlation between
age and income. Again, no obvious pattern emerges concerning the
participation rates by gender, but it is clear that men tend to purchase
more tickets than women. A lottery consumer’s educational attainment
most likely affects the decision to play, the amount to purchase, and
which games to purchase. A more educated person is less likely to play,
spends less on lottery tickets, and plays the least regressive games.
Minorities most likely spend more on tickets than Whites and play the
more regressive games. A consumer’s personal preference on whether to
play the lottery also creates a horizontal inequity inherent in the lottery
tax because not all employed citizens are participating.
Due to these apparent inequities, policymakers should consider
decreasing the takeout rate to increase consumer surplus. In addition, it
is expected that decreasing the takeout rate will increase state revenue and
possibly stimulate the economy. Given that the average takeout rate
across the states is currently 44%, it should be lowered to 19% to
maximize state revenue and substantially increase consumer surplus. It
is also possible that decreasing the takeout rate will ease the vertical and
horizontal inequities of the state lottery tax. Following these
recommendations will put more money into the pockets of both states and
lottery ticket consumers.
Endnotes
1.

Calculated using the end-point method: (37.8/1.0)^(1/24)-1=16.33% where 37.8
=$37.8B in sales in 2000, 1.0=$1.0B in sales in 1976, and 24=24 years. Source:
[National Association for State and Provisional Lotteries, 2001a].
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